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Abstract The literature on epistemic indefinites has explored the possibility that
different pragmatic competitors give rise to different epistemic effects (Alonso-
Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2010; Fa˘la˘us¸ 2009). Like epistemic indefinites, “class
B modified numerals” (Nouwen 2010), such as English at least n, signal speaker
ignorance. This paper examines the modal component of the Spanish complex
determiner algún que otro, which, like at least n, conveys that the speaker does
not know how many individuals satisfy the existential claim. We show that the
modal components of at least n and algún que otro differ. Unlike at least n, algún
que otro does not determine the minimum number of individuals that, according
to the speaker, might satisfy the existential claim. We argue that the epistemic
component of algún que otro is an implicature, and, building on the discussion in
Nouwen (forthcoming), we contend that the contrast between at least n and algún
que otro can also be traced back to the different pragmatic competitors that these
items invoke.
Keywords: Modal determiners, alternatives, implicatures.
1 Introduction
Cross-linguistically, we find existential expressions that can signal ignorance on the
part of the speaker. Two types of items that belong to this category are epistemic
indefinite determiners, like Spanish algún or English singular some,1 and “class B
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SALT 23 and the 19 International Congress of Linguists in Geneva for useful feedback. Thanks also
to Rick Nouwen, for helpful exchanges on his most recent work on at least n. One of the authors is
grateful to Monsieur Pinchot for feeding in much rich input. The research presented here has received
financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Insight
Grant 435-2013-0103, Luis Alonso-Ovalle, principal investigator; Bernhard Schwarz and Junko
Shimoyama, co-applicants) and the Fonds de Recherche Societé et Culture du Québec (Établissement
de nouveaux professeurs-chercheurs program grant 2013-NP-164823, Luis Alonso-Ovalle, principal
investigator; and Soutien aux équipes de recherche program grant 2012-SE-144646, Lisa Travis,
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1 See Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2013 for discussion of two recent accounts of epistemic
indefinites and for recent references on the topic.
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modified numerals” (Nouwen 2010), like English at least n.
Consider, for instance, the Spanish sentence in (1), with the epistemic indefinite
algún. This sentence makes an existential claim (that Juan is in a room of the house)
and additionally signals that the speaker does not know which room Juan is in.
Hence, a continuation that explicitly identifies the room in question is infelicitous,
as (2) shows.
(1) Juan
Juan
está
is
en
in
alguna
ALGUNA
habitación
room
de
of
la
the
casa.
house
‘Juan is in some room or other of the house.’
(2) Juan
Juan
está
is
en
in
alguna
ALGUNA
habitación
room
de
of
la
the
casa.
house
# En concreto,
namely
en
in
el
the
baño.
restroom
‘Juan is in some room of the house or other. Namely in the restroom.’
Similarly, the sentence in (3), with English at least two, conveys that Juan bought
a number of books (two or more), and that the speaker does not know exactly how
many. As a result, it is odd to specify the exact number of books that Juan bought,
as (4) illustrates.
(3) Juan bought at least two books.
(4) Juan bought at least two books. # To be precise, three.
Both of these ignorance components have been analyzed as quantity implica-
tures.2 In previous work (Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2008, 2010, 2011)
we have explored the possibility that different epistemic indefinites trigger different
types of pragmatic competitors, which may give rise to different epistemic effects
(see also Fa˘la˘us¸ 2009). In this paper, we present a novel contrast in the domain of
‘don’t know how many’ effects, and argue that this contrast can also be traced back
to the type of pragmatic competitors.
This paper examines the ignorance effect of the Spanish complex determiner
algún que otro, and compares it to that of at least n. Like at least n, algún que otro
makes an existential claim and signals that the speaker does not know how many
individuals satisfy this claim. For instance, the sentence in (5) conveys that Juan
bought a number of books and that the speaker does not know exactly how many
(hence, the oddity of the continuation).
2 The ignorance effect of epistemic indefinites has been treated as a quantity implicature by Alonso-
Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2008, 2010) (building on Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002), and Fa˘la˘us¸
2009, among others. For implicature-based analyses of at least n, see Büring 2008, Cummins &
Katsos 2010, Schwarz 2013 and Cohen & Krifka 2011, among others.
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(5) Juan
Juan
compró
bought
algún que otro
ALGÚN QUE OTRO
libro.
book.
(# En concreto
to be concrete
tres.)
three
Despite the apparent parallelism between at least n and algún que otro, we show
that these two items differ: only the former triggers a ‘lower bound component.’ The
sentence in (3) says that the smallest number of books that Juan might have bought,
according to the speaker, is five. In contrast, (5) says nothing about the smallest
number of books that the speaker thinks Juan might have bought. Building on work
by Nouwen (forthcoming) on at least n, we argue that this difference can be derived
by assuming that the two items evoke different pragmatic alternatives.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the contrast between at
least n and algún que otro in more detail. Section 3 summarizes the implicature-
based account of at least n put forth in Büring 2008, argues that the ignorance effect
of algún que otro is an implicature, and presents a derivation of this implicature
following the discussion of at least n in Nouwen forthcoming. Section 4 discusses
cases with deontic modals. Finally, section 5 briefly concludes.
2 Algún que otro vs. at least n: The lower bound contrast
As is well known, a sentence like (6) below conveys that, as far as the speaker knows,
Juan might have bought exactly two books and he might have bought more than two
(see, for instance, Geurts & Nouwen 2007 and Büring 2008). Thus, (6) tells us that
the smallest number of books that, according to the speaker, Juan might have bought
(what we will call ‘the epistemic lower bound’) is two.
(6) Juan bought at least two books.
Because of this epistemic lower bound, the discourse in (7) is deviant. The first
sentence commits the speaker to the possibility that Juan might have bought exactly
two books, while the second rules out this possibility.
(7) Juan bought at least two books. # Definitely no fewer than three.
Let us consider now the counterpart of (6) with the complex Spanish determiner
algún que otro:
(8) Juan
Juan
compró
bought
algún
ALGÚN
que
QUE
otro
OTRO
libro.
book
‘Juan bought books.’
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Although algún que otro is morphologically singular, the sentence in (8) conveys,
like the one in (6), that Juan bought a plurality of books.3 In that, algún que otro
behaves like the plural indefinites algunos and unos cuantos, in (9) below.4
(9) a. Juan
Juan
compró
bought
algunos
ALGUNOS
libros.
books
‘Juan bought some books.’
b. Juan
Juan
compró
bought
unos
UNOS
cuantos
CUANTOS
libros.
books
‘Juan bought a few books.’
As noted above, algún que otro signals that the speaker does not know how many
books Juan bought. In this respect, algún que otro differs from the plural indefinites
in (9), as illustrated below.
(10) a. Juan
Juan
compró
bought
algún que otro
ALGÚN QUE OTRO
libro.
book.
# En concreto
to be concrete
tres.
three
b. Juan
Juan
compró
bought
algunos
ALGUNOS
libros.
books.
En concreto
to be concrete
tres.
three
‘Juan bough some books. Three, to be exact.’
c. Juan
Juan
compró
bought
unos
UNOS
cuantos
CUANTOS
libros.
books.
En concreto
to be concrete
tres.
three
‘Juan bough a few books. Three, to be exact.’
While algún que otro patterns with at least n in conveying an epistemic effect,
these items differ in that algún que otro does not convey information about the
speaker’s epistemic lower bound. The sentence in (8) is compatible with situations
where the speaker believes that Juan bought three or more books, four or more
books, five or more books, etc. As a consequence, the discourse in (11) is felicitous.
(11) Juan
Juan
compró
bought
algún
ALGÚN
que
QUE
otro
OTRO
libro.
book
Seguro
sure
que
that
no
no
menos
fewer
de
than
tres
three
/
/
cuatro
four
/
/
cinco
five
. . .
‘Juan bought books. Definitely no less than three / four / five . . . ’
3 We translate algún que otro with an English bare plural, but we do not want to commit to an
equivalence between these two types of expressions. Notice that algún is also morphologically
singular but semantically number neutral (Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2010).
4 See Gutiérrez-Rexach 2010 and references therein for an overview of Spanish indefinites. Like the
indefinites in (9), algún que otro conveys that the number of books that Juan bought is not large, an
upper bound component that we will ignore for the rest of the paper, since it is arguably orthogonal
to the point that we make below.
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The dialogue in (12) below illustrates this point further:
(12) a. L: ¿Cuántos
how many
hijos
children
tiene
has
Juan?
Juan
‘How many children does Juan have?’
b. P: Al
at the
menos
least
dos.
two
‘At least two.’
c. P: # Alguno
ALGUNO
que
QUE
otro.
OTRO
The answer in (12b), with the Spanish counterpart of at least two (al menos dos),
is a partial answer to the question in (12a), but it still gives us some information
about P’s epistemic state. From (12b), we can conclude that P considers two as a
live possibility. In contrast, the answer in (12c) contributes no information about
the epistemic state of the speaker, other than the fact that she knows that Juan has
children — (12c) is compatible with a variety of scenarios, including scenarios
where the speaker thinks that Juan has two kids or more, scenarios where she thinks
that Juan has three kids or more, four kids or more, etc. As a result, this answer is
deviant.
In the next section we will show that this contrast between algún que otro and
at least n can be derived by assuming that the two items trigger different types of
pragmatic competitors. Section 3.1 presents Büring’s account of the ignorance effect
of at least n as an implicature (Büring 2008). Section 3.2 shows that the ignorance
effect of algún que otro is also an implicature, and — building on the discussion of
at least n in Nouwen forthcoming — puts forward a derivation of this implicature
that crucially differs from Büring’s in the types of alternatives considered. Section
3.3 extends this proposal to cases where algún que otro is under a deontic modal.
3 The epistemic effects as implicatures, and their derivations
3.1 The modal effect of at least n as an implicature: Büring (2008).
Büring (2008) analyzes at least n as the corresponding disjunction n or more. On
this view, the sentence in (6), repeated below as (13a), asserts (13b).
(13) a. Juan bought at least two books.
b. Juan bought exactly two books or he bought more than two books.
Following Sauerland (2004), let us assume that the set of pragmatic competitors
to a disjunctive sentence of the form ⌜A or B⌝ includes its conjunctive counterpart
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⌜A and B⌝ and the atomic disjuncts A and B. The sentence in (13a) invokes then the
two competitors in (14) below. As these two competitors are mutually incompatible,
the conjunctive competitor would be a contradiction, and can therefore be excluded.
(14) a. Juan bought exactly two books.
b. Juan bought more than two books.
The competition between (13b) and (14) yields the primary implicatures in (15)
below (where ‘◻’ quantifies over the worlds compatible with the speaker’s beliefs).
That is, the speaker is not convinced that Juan bought exactly two books, and she is
not convinced that Juan bought more than two books. Note that strengthening the
implicatures further is not possible. By the Maxim of Quality, we can assume that
the speaker believes that the proposition in (13b) is true (as in (16)). The secondary
implicatures in (17) would contradict that assumption.
(15) a. ¬◻ Juan bought exactly two books.
b. ¬◻ Juan bought more than two books.
(16) ◻ (Juan bought exactly two books or he bought more than two books).
(17) a. ◻ ¬ (Juan bought exactly two books).
b. ◻ ¬ (Juan bought more than two books).
Putting (16) together with the two implicatures in (15) entails that the speaker
considers it possible that Juan bought two books, and also that he bought more than
two. Therefore, (13a) gives us information about the speaker’s epistemic lower
bound: the smallest n such that (13a) conveys that the speaker believes Juan might
have bought (exactly) n books.
We turn next to the ignorance effect triggered by algún que otro. In section 3.2
we argue that this effect is a quantity implicature and in section 3.3 we put forward a
derivation of this implicature.
3.2 The modal effect of algún que otro is an implicature
The epistemic effect of algún que otro patterns with (quantity) implicatures in two
respects. First, as (18) illustrates, conversational implicatures can be reinforced
without redundancy (see (18a)), unlike entailments, as in (18b), presuppositions, as
in (18c), or conventional implicatures, as in (18d). The epistemic effect of algún que
otro can also be reinforced without redundancy, as the discourse in (19) illustrates.
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(18) a. Pinchot ate some of the cookies, but not all.
b. # Pinchot is a Canadian baker, and he is a baker.
c. # The king of France is bald, and France has a king.
d. # Pinchot, a baker from Canada, won a prize, and he is Canadian.
(19) Juan
Juan
compró
bought
algún
ALGÚN
que
QUE
otro
OTRO
libro,
book
pero
but
no
not
sé
I-know
cuántos.
how-many.
‘Juan bought books but I don’t know how many.’
Second, quantity implicatures disappear in downward entailing contexts (Gazdar
1979; Horn 1989): the sentence in (20a) can be used to convey that Juan didn’t eat
any cookies, and the sentence in (20b) quantifies over all the students that read books
in the reading list (including those who read all the books). The epistemic effect
of algún que otro also disappears in downward entailing contexts: the sentence in
(21) can be uttered by a speaker who knows perfectly well how many books each
professor bought. The sentence simply conveys that all the professors that bought
books presented a receipt.5
(20) a. It is not true that John ate some cookies.
b. All the students who read some books in the reading list will pass the
course.
(21) Todos
all
los
the
profesores
professors
que
that
compraron
bought
algún
ALGÚN
que
QUE
otro
OTRO
libro
book
presentaron
presented
un
a
recibo.
receipt
‘All the professors that bought books presented a receipt.’
If the ignorance effect of algún que otro is an implicature, how does it come
about? We turn next to this issue.
3.3 Derivation of the implicature
Recent work on at least n (Schwarz 2013, Nouwen forthcoming) critically explores
the possibility of deriving the modal component of this item as an implicature,
5 The behavior of algún que otro in downward entailing contexts deserves further investigation. While
the example in (21) is fine, at least to our ear, algún que otro is odd in some downward entailing
contexts, like the one below.
(i) Juan
Juan
raramente
rarely
compra
buys
algún
ALGÚN
que
QUE
otro
OTRO
libro.
book
In this connection, note that Nilsen (2007) observes that superlative quantifiers like at least n are
bad in many downward entailing contexts. See Cohen & Krifka 2011 for discussion.
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without having to stipulate, as Büring does, that at least n is formally equivalent to
the disjuction n or more. These discussions investigate the effect of assuming that at
least n triggers a pragmatic competition both with exactly n, exactly n+1, . . . (the
exactly-competitors), and with at least n+1, at least n+2, . . . (the scalar competitors).
Nouwen (forthcoming) motivates the exactly-competitors by applying to at least n
the account of the Spanish epistemic indefinite algún in Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-
Benito (2010). In our analysis of algún que otro, we adopt this part of Nouwen’s
proposal, and contend that this item competes only with these exactly-competitors.
In the next section, we briefly summarise our proposal for algún.
3.3.1 Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2010) on algún
As noted in the introduction, algún triggers an ignorance effect — that the speaker
cannot identify the witness of the existential claim. For instance, the sentence in
(22) conveys that the speaker does not know what room Juan is in.
(22) Juan
Juan
está
is
en
in
alguna
ALGUNA
habitación
room
de
of
la
the
casa.
house
‘Juan is in some room or other of the house.’
The epistemic effect of algún patterns with quantity implicatures in that it can be
reinforced without redundancy, as in (23a), and it disappears in downward entailing
contexts, as in (23b) (Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2010).
(23) a. Juan
Juan
está
is
en
in
alguna
ALGUNA
habitación
room
de
of
la
the
casa
house,
pero
but
no
not
sé
I-know
en
in
cuál.
which
‘Juan is in some room of the house but I don’t know which.’
b. No
Not
es
is
verdad
true
que
that
Juan
Juan
esté
is
en
in
alguna
ALGUNA
habitación
room
de
of
la
the
casa.
house
‘Juan is not in any room of the house.’
Building on the analysis of German irgendein presented in Kratzer & Shimoyama
2002, we proposed in Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2008 and Alonso-Ovalle
& Menéndez-Benito 2010 that the ignorance implicature triggered by algún arises
because this item signals that its domain of quantification cannot be a singleton set.
To implement this idea, we modelled domain restrictions via subset selection
functions. Subset selection functions take a set and return one of its subsets. Con-
textual domain restrictions can be captured by assuming that quantifiers combine
with a subset selection function f that selects a subset from the denotation of the
noun phrase (von Fintel 2000; Kratzer 2003; Kratzer 2005). Particular lexical items
can impose conditions on this function. In our analysis, algún requires its subset
577
Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito
selection function to be an ‘anti-singleton’ selection function, a function that always
returns a non-singleton subset of its argument. Our proposed denotation for algún is
in (24).
(24) JalgúnK = λ f ∶ anti-singleton( f ).λP.λQ. f (P)∩Q ≠∅
The anti-singleton constraint imposed by algún is assumed to trigger a compe-
tition between the actual assertion and the alternative assertions that would have
resulted from restricting the domain to a singleton set. Suppose that the rooms under
consideration are the bedroom, the living room, and the bathroom. Given this, the
sentence in (22) will correspond to (25), where Be is shorthand for ‘bedroom’, L for
‘living room’ and Ba, for ‘bathroom’.6,7 Due to the anti-singleton constraint, the
assertion competes with the stronger alternatives in (26). Thus, upon hearing (22),
we will draw the primary implicatures in (27) (as before, the secondary implicatures
would contradict the assumption that the speaker believes her assertion is true (see
(28)). The strengthened meaning of (22) then entails that the speaker does not know
what room Juan is in.
(25) Juan is in a room in f ({Be, L, Ba})
(26) a. Juan is in a room in {Be}
b. Juan is in a room in {L}
c. Juan is in a room in {Ba}
(27) a. ¬◻ Juan is a room in {Be}
b. ¬◻ Juan is a room in {L}
c. ¬◻ Juan is a room in {Ba}
(28) ◻ (Juan is in a room in f ({Be, L, Ba}))
The next section extends this analysis to algún que otro, following Nouwen
forthcoming, who discusses extending it to at least n.
6 The assertion made will actually depend on the value of f . Given that there are four possible mappings
from{Be, L, Ba} to one of its subsets with cardinality two or higher, there are four possible asserted
propositions, each of which will compete with the singleton alternatives. See Alonso-Ovalle &
Menéndez-Benito 2011 for discussion of this issue.
7 Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2008, 2010 assume that sentences like (22) involve a covert
epistemic operator. Here, we are assuming that epistemic modality comes in via the Maxim of
Quality, a modification that was suggested to us by an anonymous Journal of Semantics reviewer.
The two formulations do not make exactly the same predictions. However, the (simpler) derivation
above is enough to illustrate the gist of the proposal, and allows for a more direct comparison with
existing accounts of modified numerals.
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3.3.2 Algún que otro as an antisingleton quantifier
Let us assume that, like algún, algún que otro combines with a subset selection
function f and two properties, P and Q, and that its meaning is only defined if f is
an anti-singleton function. Unlike algún, however, algún que otro does not range
over individuals, but over cardinalities. When defined, it gives us truth only if there
is a number n in the domain selected by f from a set containing cardinalities two
and higher and there are exactly n individuals that are both P and Q.8
(29) Jalgún que otroK =
λ f ∶ anti-singleton( f ).λP.λQ.∃n[n ∈ f ({n′ ∶ n′ ≥ 2}) & ∣P∩Q∣ = n]
Under this analysis, the sentence in (30) will correspond to (31). As before, the
anti-singleton constraint triggers a competition with the propositions obtained by
restricting the domain to a singleton, in (32). This competition yields the implicature
that the speaker cannot commit to any of the alternatives in (32) (i.e., (33)) and that,
therefore, she does not know the exact number of books that Juan bought — the
ignorance effect.
(30) Juan
Juan
compró
bought
algún
ALGÚN
que
QUE
otro
OTRO
libro.
book
‘Juan bought books.’
(31) ∃n[n ∈ f ({n′∶ n′ ≥ 2}) & Juan bought exactly n books]
(32) a. Juan bought exactly n books & n ∈ {2}.
b. Juan bought exactly n books & n ∈ {3}.
c. Juan bought exactly n books & n ∈ {4}.
d. ⋮
(33) a. ¬◻ Juan bought exactly 2 books.
b. ¬◻ Juan bought exactly 3 books.
c. ¬◻ Juan bought exactly 4 books.
d. ⋮
Unlike in the case of at least n, however, the strengthened meaning does not
entail that the speaker believes that Juan might have bought exactly two books.
The implicature that we derive is compatible with models where the speaker thinks
that Juan might have bought two or more books, as in (34a), three or more books,
8 As noted above, Nouwen (forthcoming) considers the possibility that at least n has this denotation,
but he notes that we would need to assume that this item has scalar implicatures on top of the singleton
ones. See also Schwarz 2013 for the role of the scalar competitors of at least n.
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as in (34b), etc. (and also with models like (34c), where only some cardinalities
are possible).9 As a result, we don’t derive an epistemic lower bound effect. The
only requirement that the implicature imposes is that the number of books that Juan
bought vary across the epistemic alternatives of the speaker. The range of variation
is left open.
(34) a. w0
w1: Juan bought exactly 2 books.
w2: Juan bought exactly 3 books.
w3: Juan bought exactly 4 books.⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
- 
 
@
@R
A
A
A
AU
b. w0
w1: Juan bought exactly 3 books.
w2: Juan bought exactly 4 books.
w3: Juan bought exactly 5 books.⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
- 
 
@
@R
A
A
A
AU
c. w0
w1: Juan bought exactly 6 books.
w2: Juan bought exactly 8 books.
w3: Juan bought exactly 12 books.
- 
 
@
@R
In what follows, we will discuss the behavior of at least n and algún que otro
under deontic modals. In section 4.1 we show how a Büring-style account explains
the behavior of at least n under deontic necessity modals. In section 4.2 we discuss
algún que otro in deontic necessity sentences, and show that the proposal presented
in this section can account straightforwardly for these cases. In section 4.3 we deal
with the behavior of algún que otro in possibility sentences, and argue that these
cases can be accounted for by a different reasoning – ‘anti-exhaustivity’ (Kratzer &
Shimoyama 2002).
4 Deontic modals
4.1 At least n under deontic necessity modals: the authoritative reading
Büring (2008) observes that the sentence in (35), where at least n appears under the
surface scope of must, has two readings. Under its ignorance reading, the sentence
conveys that the password is required to be a specific number of characters, but that
the speaker does not know how many: as far as she knows, this number might be five
9 In the pictures in (34), w0 is the actual world and worlds w1,w2,w3 . . . represent types of worlds
epistemically accessible from w0 for the speaker.
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(this is the ‘epistemic lower bound’, in our terms), or it might be higher. Under its
‘authoritative reading’, the sentence conveys that the password can have exactly five
characters (a ‘permitted lower bound’) and that it can have more than five characters.
(35) The password must be at least 5 characters long. (Büring 2008)
In a Büring-style account, we can derive the authoritative reading as follows.10
Let us assume that (35) asserts (36a). This assertion will compete with (36b) and
(36c) (‘⊡’ abbreviates ‘it is required that.’), which will yield the primary implicatures
in (37). In the previous cases, these implicatures could not be strengthened to
their corresponding secondary versions and remain consistent with the assertion.
In this case, however, the secondary implicatures in (38) are compatible with the
assertion. On the assumption that the speaker is well-informed, we can then derive
the implicatures in (39). Putting this together with the assertion, we get that the
password can be exactly five characters long, and that it also can be longer.
(36) a. ⊡(The pasword is exactly 5 characters or it is more than 5 characters).
b. ⊡ The password is exactly 5 characters.
c. ⊡ The password is more than 5 characters.
(37) a. The speaker is not convinced that: ⊡ (the password is exactly 5 characters).
b. The speaker is not convinced that: ⊡ (the password is more than 5 characters).
(38) a. The speaker is convinced that not: ⊡ (the password is exactly 5 characters).
b. The speaker is convinced that not: ⊡ (the password is more than 5 characters).
(39) a. The password is not required to be exactly 5 characters.
b. The password is not required to be more than 5 characters.
4.2 Algún que otro under deontic necessity modals
Algún que otro contrasts with at least n when embedded under deontic necessity
modals. The sentence in (40), for instance, is deviant as an instruction. Intuitively,
all this sentence conveys is the (trivial) information that the password must have
characters. This is expected under the proposal above, which predicts that (40) will
not give us information about what the permitted lower bound is.
(40) # La
the
contraseña
password
debe
must
tener
have
algún
ALGÚN
que
QUE
otro
OTRO
carácter.
character
‘The password must have characters.’
10 See Schwarz 2011 for discussion.
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Let us illustrate how this works. The sentence in (40) will make the assertion in
(41), which will compete with the propositions in (42). As in section 4.1 above, we
can ultimately derive the implicature that all these competitors are false.
(41) ⊡∃n[n ∈ f ({n′∶ n′ ≥ 2 }) & the password is exactly n characters]
(42) a. ⊡∃n[n ∈ {2} & the password is exactly n characters]
b. ⊡∃n[n ∈ {3} & the password is exactly n characters]
c. ⋮
The resulting strengthened meaning rules out models where the password has
to be a specific number of characters, but it is still compatible with a wide array
of models that vary with respect to the permitted lower bound. The strengthened
meaning is satisfied in models like (43a), where the password can have exactly
two characters, but also in models where the permitted lower bound is higher, like
(43b).11 Thus, upon hearing (40), we will not know what model we are in, and
therefore will not know what the allowed range of characters is. As a result, (40) is
correctly predicted to be deviant.
(43) a. w0
w1: the password has exactly 2 characters.
w2: the password has exactly 3 characters.
w3: the password has exactly 4 characters.
- 
 
@
@R
b. w0
w1: the password has exactly 8 characters.
w2: the password has exactly 10 characters.
w3: the password has exactly 12 characters.
- 
 
@
@R
In general, algún que otro and at least n contrast sharply in contexts where
determining a permitted lower bound is relevant. Consider, for instance, a course
syllabus that states (44) below. When reading (44), students will conclude that the
minimum number of pages that they have to write is ten. This is relevant information
for those students looking forward to doing the minimum to pass the course. In
contrast, (45) says nothing about the minimum number of pages. All the students
can conclude from this is that the paper must have pages.
(44) The term paper must have at least ten pages.
(45) El
the
trabajo
paper
debe
must
tener
have
alguna
ALGUNA
que
QUE
otra
OTRA
página.
page
‘The paper must have pages.’
11 In the pictures in (43), w0 is the actual world, and w1−3 are types of permitted worlds.
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4.3 Possibility modals
The proposal above does not yield the right interpretation for possibility modals with
algún que otro.12 Let us illustrate this with (46) below.
(46) Para
To
relajarte,
relax,
puedes
you can
leer
read
alguna
ALGUNA
que
QUE
otra
OTRA
novela
novel
policiaca.
detective
‘To relax, you can read detective novels.’
This sentence can convey that, to relax, the addressee can read detective novels,
but does not have to read any specific number. However, as things stand, we derive
a weaker meaning. The assertion in (47) will compete with the propositions in
(48) (‘⟐’ abbreviates ‘it is possible that’). The primary implicatures yield only the
weak inference that the speaker is not convinced about the truth of any of these
competitors. Strengthening this implicature further would contradict the assertion.
(47) ⟐∃n[n ∈ f ({n∶ n ≥ 2}) & you read exactly n novels]
(48) a. ⟐ [you read exactly n novels & n ∈ {2}]
b. ⟐ [you read exactly n novels & n ∈ {3}]
c. ⋮
Exactly the same issue arises with algún in possibility sentences. Alonso-Ovalle
& Menéndez-Benito (2010) follow Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002) in assuming a
different pragmatic reasoning for these cases: anti-exhaustivity. The idea is that the
speaker can use an anti-singleton indefinite to prevent the hearer from drawing a
potential exhaustivity inference. Suppose that A asks where Juan is, and B replies
with (49). B’s answer is naturally understood as an exhaustive enumeration of
the possible places where Juan might be (Zimmerman 2000). Using a singleton
indefinite could trigger the same kind of inference: (50) would indicate that Juan
can only be in the kitchen. Following Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002), Alonso-Ovalle
& Menéndez-Benito (2010) propose that an anti-singleton indefinite can be used to
avoid that potential inference.
(49) Juan might be in the bathroom or in the kitchen.
(50) Juan might be in a room in {kitchen}
Applying this reasoning to our example in (46) yields the desired result. Let
us assume, for the sake of illustration, that the only relevant quantities are two,
three, and four. Then, anti-exhaustivity will yield the implicatures in (51). These
implicatures rule out models where the addressee has to read a particular number of
novels, but does not require all quantities to be possibilities.
12 At least n is deviant under possibility modals. See Büring 2008 for discussion.
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(51) a. ⟐ you read exactly 2 novels → (⟐ (you read exactly 3 novels) ∨ ⟐ (you
read exactly 4 novels))
b. ⟐ you read exactly 3 novels → (⟐ (you read exactly 2 novels) ∨ ⟐ (you
read exactly 4 novels))
c. ⟐ you read exactly 4 novels → (⟐ (you read exactly 2 novels) ∨ ⟐ (you
read exactly 3 novels))
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a novel contrast in the domain of the existential
expressions that convey a ‘don’t know how many’ effect: we have shown that
at least n contrasts with algún que otro in that only the former conveys a ‘lower
bound component.’ In line with recent literature on epistemic indefinites (see, e.g.
Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2010 or Fa˘la˘us¸ 2011), we have proposed that
this contrast can be derived by assuming that the two items trigger different kinds of
pragmatic competitors.
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